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Abstract
Crucial to an Evolutionary Algorithm’s perfor-
mance is its selection scheme. We mathematically
investigate the relation between polynomial rank
and probabilistic tournament methods which are
(respectively) generalisations of the popular linear
ranking and tournament selection schemes. We
show that every probabilistic tournament is equiv-
alent to a unique polynomial rank scheme. In fact,
we derived explicit operators for translating be-
tween these two types of selection. Of particular
importance is that most linear and most practical
quadratic rank schemes are probabilistic tourna-
ments.
Keywords: evolutionary algorithms, ranking se-
lection, tournament selection, equivalence, effi-
ciency.
1 Introduction
Evolutionary algorithms. Evolutionary Algorithms
(EAs) are probabilistic search algorithms based on evo-
lution [Gol89, ES03]. They operate by exploiting the in-
formation contained in a population of possible solutions
(via similarities between individuals). The aim is to find
an individual that maximises (or minimises) an objective
function, which maps from individuals to the real line.
The population is transformed by first selecting individu-
als. Mutation and/or recombination is then used to either
replace a few individuals from the population or create an
entirely new population.
Standard selection methods. The most prevalent
methods for selecting individuals are proportionate, lin-
ear rank, tournament, and truncation [HL06]. In propor-
tionate selection individuals are chosen with a probability
proportional to their fitness (the value of the objective
function evaluated at the individual) [Ba¨c94]. A common
method to gain more control over selection pressure, is to
scale the fitness values before the selection is made [Ba¨c94].
Linear ranking proceeds by ordering the population ac-
cording to their fitness. The chance that an individual
is selected is then a linear function of its (unique) rank
[Ba¨c94]. Tournament selection creates a tournament by
randomly choosing t individuals, the best individual in the
tournament is then selected. For truncation selection the
k fittest individuals have uniform probability of selection,
while the remainder have zero chance of being selected.
The choice of selection scheme is crucial to algorithm
performance. If the selection pressure is too high then
diversity of the population decreases rapidly and the al-
gorithm converges prematurely to local optima or worse.
With too little pressure there is not enough push toward
better individuals and the population takes too long to
converge. Many methods to choose or adapt the selec-
tion pressure or avoid the problem otherwise have been
invented (see [HL06] for some references). A particularly
simple one is fitness uniform selection, which uniformly
selects a fitness value, and then the individual with fitness
closest to this value.
It is quite profitable to study selection schemes due to
their generality. They depend only on the set of fitness
values and not on the rest of the algorithm. Hence their
behaviour can be studied in isolation and the results ap-
plied to any evolutionary algorithm. In this paper we in-
troduce and study generalizations of rank and tournament
selection (both actually only depend on the rank and not
the absolute fitness value itself).
Polynomial rank selection. Linear ranking has a small
range of selection pressures (from [Ba¨c94], for a popula-
tion of n individuals the probability that the fittest indi-
vidual is selected must be between 1/n and 2/n), but it
has the flexibility of a real-valued parameter that can vary
continuously (the slope of the linear function). Ranking
schemes with high selection pressures, such as when the
probability of selection is an exponential function of the
rank, have occasionally been used [WC02]. It is natural
then to generalise from linear to polynomial functions to
cover the instances where medium pressure is required.
Hence the probability of an individual with rank k being
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selected with a polynomial rank scheme of degree d is:
P (I = k) =
d+1∑
l=1
alk
l−1 (1)
where al∈IR are parameters defined by the algorithm de-
signer. For simplicity we assume that selection is per-
formed with replacement and each individual has unique
rank, however our results still hold when there are ties in
the rank. The only restriction on the ak is that they must
produce a proper probability distribution, i.e. for a popu-
lation of n individuals: P (I=k)≥0 for all k=1,2,...,n and∑n
k=1P (I=k)=1. Hence, while the population is ordered,
the schemes may favour low ranks, high ranks or neither,
depending on the choice of the (al).
This selection method encompasses the low pressures of
linear schemes (a3= ...=ad+1=0) and can give good ap-
proximations of the high pressure exponential cases (via
Taylor polynomials). Furthermore the wealth of general
knowledge about polynomials means that while it has nu-
merous parameters (coefficients of the monomials), it is
also easy to predict their impact.
Probabilistic tournament selection. Tournament se-
lection has a large range [Ba¨c94], but a discrete parame-
ter, leaving the possible selection pressures somewhat re-
stricted. This can be overcome by selecting probabilisti-
cally from the tournament, rather than always choosing
the best in the tournament. However the extra parame-
ters required are not easy to understand. Their precise
effect on the behaviour is not at all obvious. Probabilis-
tic Tournament selection still only sorts t¿n individuals,
making it much faster than any ranking scheme.
Let is be the (rank of the) individual in position s ∈
{1,...,t} of the rank-ordered tournament. We call s the
seed of i. Let P (Is=k) be the probability that seed s has
rank k. In any given tournament, the probability that the
seed s individual is chosen will be a user defined constant
αs. Then the probability of an individual k being selected
through a size t probabilistic tournament is:
P (I = k) =
t∑
s=1
αsP (Is = k) (2)
Standard (deterministic) tournament always selects the in-
dividual of highest rank in the tournament, i.e. α1=1 and
α2= ..=αt=0.
To ensure that choosing a winner from the tournament
makes sense, the αs must satisfy the probability con-
straints αs ≥ 0∀s and
∑t
s=1αs =1. We assume that the
tournament is created by random selection with replace-
ment and for now that each individual in the population
has a unique fitness. This defines P (Is= k) (Section 2).
Note that even if every individual in the population is
unique, it is possible for it to be repeated in the tourna-
ment.
Previous work on the relation between rank and
tournament selection. In this paper we investigate the
equivalence between the generalised schemes (1) and (2)
with the aim of providing a scheme that combines the
superior understanding of polynomial rank with the speed
of probabilistic tournament.
Ba¨ck [Ba¨c94] found that an individual’s chance of se-
lection in deterministic tournament selection is a polyno-
mial, hence each is equivalent to a polynomial rank selec-
tion method. Wieczorek and Czech [WC02], and Blickle
[BT95] arrived at the same conclusion using a different
method. So while the name ‘polynomial rank selection’ is
new, its concept is fairly old.
The study of probabilistic tournaments isn’t new either:
Hutter [Hut91, p.11] proved that every size 2 probabilistic
tournament is a linear rank scheme, and Goldberg [GD91]
did the same but only for a continuous population. Fogel
[Fog88] applied to the traveling salesman problem, a vari-
ation wherein each individual underwent numerous t=2
tournaments. The probability of winning each tournament
was dependent on the fitness of the individuals involved
and the individuals selected were those with the highest
number of wins.
Contents: Equivalence of polynomial rank and
probabilistic tournament selection. We extend these
results by finding that every t sized probabilistic tourna-
ment is equivalent to a polynomial rank scheme with a
polynomial degree of d= t−1 or less (Section 2). We con-
tinue on to show that the equivalence is unique (Section
3), and give an explicit expression for the inverse map
(Section 4). This allows the establishment of simple cri-
teria for polynomial rank schemes that are probabilistic
tournaments (Section 5). Unfortunately not every possi-
ble polynomial rank scheme satisfies the criteria, but most
(and in the limit of an infinite population, all) linear and
most “interesting” quadratic ones are equivalent to proba-
bilistic tournaments. This is good enough for all practical
purposes, if it generalises to higher order polynomials.
Notation. Throughout the paper we use the following
notation. If not otherwise indicated, an index has the full
range as defined in this table.
Symbol Explanation
δij Kronecker symbol
(δij=1 for i=j and δij=0 for i 6=j)
n Number of individuals in the population
i,j,k Rank (unique label) of individuals ∈{1,...,n}
ι,κ Rank indices that only run from 1,...,t
p,q,r,s Seed index ∈{1,...,t}
Is Rank of the individual with seed s
I Rank of the individual selected
pii=P (I= i) Probability that i is selected
l Polynomial coefficients index ∈{1,...,d+1}
al Coefficients of xl−1 for the polynomial
α1,α2,...,αt Tournament selection coefficients
xi,x,(xi) Vector x=(xi)=(x1,...,xt)
∆m m−1 dimensional probability simplex
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2 Probability of Selection via a
Tournament
In this section we find the probability of an individual be-
ing successful (the winner) via tournament selection. This
will provide a formula for an equivalent ranking selection
scheme. It is sufficient to consider just one selection event
in isolation, since we consider selection with replacement.
We assume a population P consisting of n individuals
c1,...,cn with fitness f1,...,fn. Without loss of generality
we assume that they are ordered, i.e. f(i)≥ f(j) for all
j≤ i. For now we also assume that all fitness values are
different, hence individual ci has rank i. The rank is all
we need in the following, and we will say “individual i”,
meaning “individual ci”.
Definition 1 (polynomial rank selection)
Polynomial a-ranking selects individual ck from pop-
ulation P with probability P (I=k)=∑d+1l=1 alkl−1
Definition 2 (probabilistic tournament selection)
A probabilistic α-tournament selects t individuals from
population P uniformly at random with replacement.
Let cIs be the individual of rank s in the tournament,
called seed s (while it has rank Is in the population).
Finally the seed s individual, Is, is chosen with probability
αs=P (I=Is) as the winner I.
Theorem 3 (tournament=polynomial) Probabilistic
α-tournament selection coincides with polynomial a-
ranking (for d= t−1 and suitable a).
Proof. We derive an explicit expression for the probabil-
ity pik that the tournament winner has rank k. Any seed s
may have rank k (Is=k) and may be the winner (I=Is),
hence
pik ≡ P (I = k) =
t∑
s=1
P (I = Is)P (Is = k) = (2)
where we have exploited that by definition the probability
that I = Is is independent of the rank Is = k. P (Is = k)
is the probability that seed s has rank k. It is difficult
to formally derive an expression for P (Is=k), but we can
easily get it by considering distribution functions. The
probability of an individual selected into the tournament
having a particular rank is 1/n, hence having rank equal to
or less than k is k/n and larger than k is 1−k/n. Further,
Ir≤ k∧Ir+1>k if and only if r seeds have rank ≤ k and
t−r seeds have rank >k, hence
P (Ir ≤ k ∧ Ir+1 > k) =
(
t
r
)
( kn )
r(1− kn )t−r
since there are
(
t
r
)
ways of choosing r individuals with
rank ≤ k from t individuals. The above expression is a
polynomial in k of degree t. Together with
P (Is ≤ k) =
t∑
r=s
P (Ir ≤ k ∧ Ir+1 > k),
we get the explicit expression
P (Is = k) = P (Is ≤ k)− P (Is ≤ k − 1) (3)
=
t∑
r=s
(
t
r
)[
( kn )
r(1− kn )t−r − (k−1n )r(1− k−1n )t−r
]
Using the binomial theorem to find the kt and kt−1
coefficients in the square brackets above reveals that the
former coefficients cancel out while the latter do not. This
implies that P (Is= k) is a polynomial in k of degree (at
most) t−1, and thus the weighted average (2) is as well.
Summing (2) over the population yields
∑n
k=1P (I=k)=1,
as it should, since the tournament coefficients are such
that some individual is always chosen. Consequently,
every tournament is a polynomial rank scheme of degree
at most t−1 (one can choose α such that it is of lower
degree). 2
Examples. Expression (3) can be rewritten as
P (Is = k) =
s−1∑
r=0
(
t
r
)[
(k−1n )
r(1− k−1n )t−r − ( kn )r(1− kn )t−r
]
which will be convenient in the following examples. Stan-
dard tournament always selects I1 (α1=1), hence [Ba¨c94]
P (I = k) = P (I1 = k) = (1− k−1n )t − (1− kn )t
See Figure 1. For t = 1 there is no selection pressure,
P (I=k)= 1n . For t=2 we get
P (I1 = k) = 2n−2k+1n2 and P (I2 = k) =
2k−1
n2
Hence probabilistic tournaments of size 2 lead to linear
ranking [Hut91]
P (I=k) = α1P (I1=k) + α2P (I2=k) = a1 + a2k,
a1 = 1n2 [(2n+ 1)α1 − α2], a2 = 2n2 (α2 − α1) (4)
Remark. More interesting is actually the converse,
replacing rank selections by equivalent efficient tourna-
ments. Before we can answer this, we need to break down
(3) into a product of simple regular matrices.
3 The Map from Tournament to
Polynomial is Unique
The next natural question is whether different tournament
bias α implies different selection probability. It seems
plausible that the maps from tournaments α to rank prob-
abilities pi and to polynomial coefficients a are injective,
but the proof is fairly involved. The good news is that
construction in the proof allows us to find a closed form
expression for the desired inverse. Let ∆m = {x ∈ IRm :
xi≥0∀i,
∑m
i=1xi=1} be the m−1 dimensional probability
simplex, i.e. pi∈∆n and α∈∆t.
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Figure 1: [tournament probabilities for large n] Probability
density nP (I1=xn) that the tournament winner has rank
xn, for tournament size t=1,2,3,5,8.
Theorem 4 (tournament→polynomial) The func-
tion R :∆t→∆n in (2), mapping tournament probabilities
α to rank probabilities pi, is total, linear, and injective:
pik = P (I = k) =
t∑
s=1
Rskαs, i.e. pi = Rα,
where Rsk=P (Is=k) is defined in (3). Matrix R can also
be written as a product R =DPFCD = V NFCD = V T
with matrices D, P , F , C, D, V , and N defined in (7),
(9), (10), (8), (6), (12), and (13). Similarly, the function
T : ∆t→ IRt, mapping α to polynomial coefficients a, is
unique, linear and injective:
al =
t∑
s=1
T sl αs, i.e. a = Tα,
where matrix T =NFCD.
Proof. Tournament always selects one individual from P
as the winner, hence Rα∈∆n for every α∈∆t. See the
proof of Theorem 3 for how to prove this formally.
Matrices H and G. We now prove injectivity. With
Hrk := (
k
n )
r(1− kn )t−r and Grk :=
(
t
r
)
(Hrk −Hrk−1)
we can write (3) as
Rsk ≡ P (Is = k) =
t∑
r=s
Grk (5)
Einstein notation. Einstein’s sum convention will be
convenient in the following argument: When an index oc-
curs repeatedly in the multiplication of two objects, a sum
over the index over its full range is implicitly understood,
e.g. GrkD
s
r means
∑t
r=1G
r
kD
s
r .
Lower-triangular matrix D. The lower-triangular ma-
trix
Dsr :=
{
1 if s ≤ r
0 if s > r (6)
has the property that
∑t
r=1G
r
kD
s
r=
∑t
r=sG
r
k. Using Ein-
stein’s sum convention this allows us to rewrite (5) as
Rsk = G
r
kD
s
r
i.e. as a product of an n×t matrix G with a t×t matrix
D.
Inverse of D. The “inverse” of D is:
D
i
k :=
 1 if k = i−1 if i = k − 10 otherwise
 = δk,i − δk−1,i (7)
This is a matrix with 1 on the primary diagonal; −1 on
the diagonal that is below the primary diagonal; and 0
otherwise.
Decomposing G. Grk itself can actually be decomposed
into D
i
k and H
q
i and a pure diagonal matrix
Crq =
(
t
q
)
δq,r (8)
comprised of the binomial coefficients:
Grk = (H
q
k −Hqk−1)Crq = D
i
kH
q
i C
r
q
(note thatD is the inverse of an n×n sized D matrix here).
Decomposing H into P and F . We can decompose
Hqi further be using the binomial identity:
Hqi = (
i
n )
q(1− in )t−q
= ( in )
q
∑t−q
s=1
(
t−q
s
)
(−in )
t−q−s
=
∑t−q
s=1(−)t−q−s
(
t−q
s
)
( in )
t−s
=
∑t
p=q(−)p−q
(
t−q
t−p
)
( in )
p
So Hqi =P
p
i F
q
p , where P is a matrix of monomials:
P pi := (
i
n )
p, (9)
and F is a lower-triangular matrix composed of various
binomials:
F qp :=
{
(−)p−q(t−qt−p) if q ≤ p
0 otherwise
(10)
Matrices N , V , and R. Putting everything together
we have
Rsk = D
i
kP
p
i F
q
pC
r
qD
s
r
The (linear) map Rsk is a polynomial in k of degree (at
most) t−1. We can find its coefficients by rewriting
D
i
kP
p
i = P
p
k − P pk−1 = ( kn )p − (k−1n )p (11)
=
p∑
l=1
kl−1(−)p−l( pl−1)( 1n )p = V lkNpl
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where
V lk := k
l−1, and (12)
Npl :=
{
(−)p−l( pl−1)( 1n )p l ≤ p
0 otherwise
(13)
Hence we get the alternative representation
pik = Rskαs = V
l
kN
p
l F
q
pC
r
qD
s
rαs (14)
Injective. Matrices D, D, and F are lower-triangular
matrices with 1 in the diagonal, and hence are invertible
(thus injective). C is diagonal and N upper triangular,
both nowhere zero on the diagonal, hence invertible too.
The first t rows of V map from a set of t coefficients b to the
polynomial p(x)=
∑t
l=1blx
l−1 evaluated at x=1,2,3,...,t.
A degree t−1 polynomial like p is uniquely determined
by t image points (see Appendix), hence V is injective.
Similarly for P or exploit P lk = kV
l
k(
1
n )
l (no summation).
This proves that R is injective.
Matrix T . Combining the map from a to pi
pik ≡ P (I = k) =
t∑
l=1
alk
l−1 = V lkal i.e. pi = V a,
with al=T sl αs we get
pik = V lkT
s
l αs
Comparing this with (14) and using injectivity of V we
see that
T sl = N
p
l F
q
pC
r
qD
s
r (15)
which is injective, since N , F , C, and D are invertible.
2
Discussion. Given a Polynomial Rank scheme it is pos-
sible and easy (using computer software) to find if it is
equivalent to a probabilistic tournament (and get the cor-
responding parameters) by applying the inverse of T to a.
If the output satisfies the probability requirements α∈∆t,
then it is indeed a probabilistic tournament.
4 Map from Polynomial Ranking to
Tournaments
We now derive explicit expressions for the really interest-
ing converse of map T , which allows replacement of ineffi-
cient rank selections by equivalent efficient tournaments.
From the last section we know that the inverse exists.
Theorem 5 (polynomial→tournament) The func-
tion T : IRt → IRt, mapping polynomial coefficients a to
tournament parameters α is linear
αs =
t∑
l=1
T
l
sal, i.e. α = Ta
where matrix T=T−1=DC F N , with D, C, F , N defined
in (7), (16), (17), (18). a-polynomial ranking can be im-
plemented as an α-tournament if and only if, α=Ta∈∆t.
Inverse matrices. In the following P and V respectively
denote the upper t×t submatrix of P and V . The inverse
matrices are as follows
C
q
r := δr,q/
(
t
r
)
(16)
F
r
q :=
(
t−r
t−q
)
if r ≤ q and 0 else (17)
N
l
p = P
ι
pD
κ
ι V
l
κ (18)
P
κ
l := n
lV
κ
l
1
κ (no summation) (19)
The inverse of the diagonal matrix C is obvious. The
expression for P immediately follows from P lκ = κV lκ(
1
n )
l
(no summation).
F qpF
r
q=0 for r>p (since then either r>q or q>p) and
for r≤p we have
F qpF
r
q =
∑p
q=r(−)p−q
(
t−q
t−p
)(
t−r
t−q
)
=
(
t−r
t−p
)∑p
q=r
(
p−r
q−r
)
(−)p−q = δp,r
The first equality is by definition, the second equal-
ity is a simple reshuﬄing of factorials, and the last
equality follows from the well-known binomial identity∑m
i=0(−)i
(
m
i
)
= 0 for m≥ 1. This proves that F is the
inverse of F .
Unfortunately we were not able to invert N directly,
although N seems similar to (the transpose of) F . So we
used relation (11) to invert N in (18). But now we need
the inverse of P , which can be reduced by (19) to the
inverse of V .
Inverse of V . The most difficult matrix to invert is V .
This special Vandermonde matrix V can be written as
a product of a lower L and upper-triangular matrix U ,
whose inverses are [Tur66]:
V
κ
l := U
s
lL
κ
s
L
κ
s :=
(−)s−κ
(s− κ)!(κ− 1)! for s ≥ κ and 0 else
U
s
l := S
(l)
s = Stirling numbers of the first kind
The Stirling numbers S(l)s numbers are defined as the co-
efficients of the polynomial x(x−1)...(x−s+1), i.e. by
s∑
l=0
S(l)s x
l =
x!
(x− s)! and S
(l)
s = 0 for l > s
There are many ways to compute S(l)s , e.g. recursively by
S
(l)
s+1=S
(l−1)
s −sS(l)s or directly [AS74, p.824]. For r≥ κ
we get
V lrV
κ
l =
t∑
l=1
rl−1
l∑
s=κ
S
(l)
s (−)s−κ
(s− κ)!(κ− 1)!
=
t∑
s=κ
[
∑s
l=1 r
l−1S(l)s ](−)s−κ
(s− κ)!(κ− 1)!
=
t∑
s=κ
[(r − 1)...(r − s+ 1)](−)s−κ
(s− κ)!(κ− 1)!
=
(
r−1
κ−1
) r∑
s=κ
(
r−κ
r−s
)
(−)s−κ = δκ,r
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The case r<κ is similar. This shows that V is the inverse
of (the first t rows of) V .
Linear ranking example. For t=d+1=2 we can com-
pute the matrices by hand. This list of (reduced) matrices
is a useful sanity check for the reader’s own implementa-
tion:
F =
(
1 0
−1 1
)
, F =
(
1 0
1 1
)
, H = 1n2
(
n−1 2n−4 3n−9 ··· 0
1 4 9 ··· n2
)>
C =
(
2 0
0 1
)
, C = 12
(
1 0
0 2
)
, G = 1n2
(
n−1n−3 ··· −1+n
1 3 ··· 2n−1
)>
N = 1n2
(
n−1
0 2
)
, N = n2
(
2 1
0n
)
P = 1n2
(
n 2n 3n ···n2
1 4 9 ···n2
)>, P = n2 ( 4 −1−2n n)
V =
(
1 1 ··· 1
1 2 ···n
)>, V = ( 2−1−1 1)
T = 1n2
(
2n+1−1
−2 2
)
, T = n4
(
2 1
2 2n+1
)
U =
(
1−1
0 1
)
, L =
(
1 0
−1 1
)
, R = 1n2
(
2n−1 2n−3 ··· 1
1 3 ··· 2n−1
)>
We see that pi=Rα and a=Tα coincide with (4), as they
should.
Computational complexity. Together this allows us to
compute α from a and vice versa in time O(t2) and pi from
α in time O(nt). Once α is known, tournament selection
needs only time O(t) per winner selection.
5 What Polynomial Selection Schemes
are Tournaments?
Theorem 5 does not give us conditions under which the re-
sulting tournament parameters α=Ta are valid. We look
for such conditions so that we can reliably change/create
tournament schemes in the more understandable set of
polynomial rank schemes. Without these conditions there
can be no guarantee that whatever created would be a
probabilistic tournament.
Range of linear ranking. Let us first consider the case
of linear ranking (d=1),
P (I = k) = a1 + a2k
We want to find the range of a1 and a2 for which this is a
proper probability distribution in ∆n. The sum-constraint
leads to
1 =
n∑
k=1
P (I = k) = a1n+ a2 12n(n+ 1)
=⇒ a1 = 1n [1− 12a2(n2 + n)] (20)
Next are the positivity constraints P (I = k) ≥ 0∀k. A
linear function is ≥ 0 if and only if it is ≥ 0 at its ends,
i.e. P (I=1)≥0 and P (I=n)≥0. Inserting (20) into these
constraints yields:
P (I = 1) ≡ a1 + a2 ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ a2 ≤ 2n2−n
P (I = n) ≡ a1 + a2n ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ a2 ≥ − 2n2−n
So the possible linear rank schemes are those with
|a2| ≤ 2n2−n and a1 satisfying (20) (21)
Range of tournament size 2. The example (4) shows
that size t = 2 probabilistic α-tournaments have a2 =
2(α2−α1)/n2. Since α∈∆2, a2 has range − 2n2 ... 2n2 . As
it should be, this is a subset of the possible linear rank
schemes. Hence the linear rankings that are probabilistic
tournaments are those with
|a2| ≤ 2n2 and a1 given by (20) (22)
This is slightly narrower than |a2| ≤ 2n2−n , i.e. there are
some rankings that are not probabilistic tournaments. On
the other hand, 2n2−n/
2
n2 tends to 1 as n grows, hence for
n large (e.g. about 100) nearly all linear rankings can be
translated into probabilistic tournaments. The coverage
is good enough for all practical purposes.
The general case. A probabilistic selection scheme is
completely determined by pi, different pi correspond to
different selection schemes, and every pi ∈∆n is a valid
selection scheme. Hence, ∆n is the set of all possible
probabilistic selection schemes. The set of (valid) size t
tournament schemes is
R∆t := {pi = Rα : α ∈ ∆t} ⊂ ∆n
Since R is injective, this is a t−1 dimensional irregular
simplex embedded in the n−1 dimensional simplex ∆n.
The set of (incl. invalid) degree (up to) t−1 polynomial
ranking schemes is
V IRt := {pi = V a : a ∈ IRt} 6⊆ ∆n
This is a t-dimensional hyperplane. Only pi in ∆n are
valid, hence V IRt∩∆n is the set of (valid) polynomial rank-
ing schemes. The intersection of a simplex with a plane
gives a closed, bounded, convex polytope, in our case of di-
mension t−1. The Krein-Milman Theorem [Edw65, p.707]
says that for a closed, bounded, convex subset A of IRt
with a finite number of extreme points (=corners), A is
the convex hull of the extreme points of A. Hence the ex-
treme points of V IRt∩∆n completely characterize/define
the set.
If/since we are not concerned with the covering of
V IRt∩∆n in ∆n itself, we can study the covering in the
lower-dimensional polynomial coefficient space IRt. The
set=polytope of all polynomial coefficients a that lead to
valid selection probabilities is
V∆n := {a ∈ IRt : V a ∈ ∆n}
while the set=simplex of coefficients reachable by tourna-
ments is
T∆t := {a = Tα : α ∈ ∆t} ⊂ V∆n
These sets are the images of V IRt∩∆n and the simplex
∆t under V and T respectively. These maps are injective
(Section 4) so V∆n and T∆t are completely determined
by their extreme points. The extreme points of ∆t are just
the conventional IRt basis vectors es, so T∆t is the convex
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hull of {T (es) :s=1,...,t}. The polytope V IRt∩∆n can be
quite complex, and finding the extreme points daunting.
This is essentially what we did for the t= 2 case in the
above paragraphs.
We estimated the proportion of degree t−1 polynomials
covered by T∆t for various t using a Monte-Carlo algo-
rithm1 (Table 1). It shows that for n≥100, practically all
linear rank schemes are probabilistic tournaments.
Nothing concrete can be concluded about the coverage
for t=4,5. Table 1 only suggests that the number of t−
1 degree polynomials equivalent to t-sized tournaments
decreases as t increases.
Tournament size 3. In the t=3 case we can extend our
knowledge by finding V∆n graphically. The restriction∑n
k=1pik=1 means that the k
2 coefficient a3, is completely
determined by a1 and a2.
a3 =
1∑n
k=1 k
2
(
1− na1 − 12n(n+ 1)a2
)
(23)
Hence V∆n is a 2 dimensional hyperplane. P (I=k)≥0 for
each k defines a set of halfspaces: {(a1,a2,a3) : a1+a2k+
a3k
2≥0}; V∆n is their intersection (over k) restricted to
the plane given by (23).
T∆3 is simply a filled triangle with corners {T (es) :s=
1,2,3}. Comparison with V∆n (Figures 2, 3 and 4) sug-
gests that the coverage of T∆3 is stable for n→∞. Hence
for large populations about a third of the quadratic poly-
nomials can be written as size-3 probabilistic tournaments.
In practice, selection schemes with probability monoton-
ically increasing with fitness are used. So not the whole
of V∆n is interesting, but only the subset of monoton-
ically increasing or possibly decreasing probabilities on
{1,2,...,n} (light grey in figures 2, 3 and 4). The remain-
der of V∆n is composed of schemes that favour the middle
ranks or both high and low ranked individuals (dark grey).
Any polynomial scheme P (I = k) = a1 + a2k +
1Pn
i=1i
2
(
1−na1− 12n(n+1)a2
)
k2 is a parabola2, so it is
symmetric about it’s stationary point, xst.pt.. Hence
P (I = k) is monotonic on {1,2,...,n} if and only if xst.pt.
lies outside the interval (1+ 12 ,n− 12 ).
i.e.
xst.pt. =
−a2
1− na1 − 12n(n+ 1)a2
(
n∑
i=1
i2
)
≤ 1 + 1
2
OR
xst.pt. ≥ n− 12
Figure 4 suggests that these regions of usefulness effec-
tively lie entirely in T∆3 for n≥300. Hence for sufficiently
large n the most useful degree 2 polynomial schemes are
perfectly reproduced by some probabilistic tournament.
An example of a less applicable selection scheme is the
polynomial given by a1=0.01 and a2=−1×10−4 (which
1The t=2 case was calculated directly from (21) and (22)
2We temporarily consider k to range over the real line
n = 4 n = 10 n = 20 n = 100 n = 300
t = 2 0.7500 0.9000 0.9500 0.9900 0.9967
t = 3 0.270 0.348 0.342 0.332
t = 4 0.12 0.15 0.16
t = 5 0.02
Table 1: fraction of possible t−1 degree polynomials that
can be represented as t-sized probabilistic tournaments
0.5
−0.5
1
−1.5
1.5
1.0
0.0
2
−1.0
0−1
p 1
¡¡µ
p 2»»9
p 3ﬀ
p 4
¡¡µ
a1
a2
Figure 2: [n = 4,t = 3] The shaded region is the set of
possible polynomials, whilst the light grey area is the set of
the most useful polynomials. The triangle is the boundary
of the set that can be written as t=3 tournaments. At p1:
a3
.=−0.246. At p2: a3 .=0.159. At p3: a3 .=0.236. At p4:
a3
.=0.023.
lies in the dark grey region). It favours both high ranks
and low ranks (Figure 5) and any algorithm using this
scheme will spend half of the time searching in the wrong
place. However it is still usable (like in fitness uniform
selection [HL06]).
The points p1, p2 ... are extreme points of V∆n. They
indicate that the range of a3 values is significantly smaller
than the range of a2 (which in turn has a smaller range
than a1).
V∆n being the intersection of a finite number of halfs-
paces and planes means its boundary is actually a series
of straight lines. V∆n appears curved in figures 3 and 4
simply due to the many halfspaces that are involved.
6 Discussion/Conclusions
Rank ties. Individuals with the same fitness lead to ties
in the ranking. If we break ties (arbitrarily but consis-
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0.02
0.01
0.0
−0.01
−0.02
−0.03
−0.04
0.20.10.0
p 1
¡¡µ
p 2XXy
p 3
»»:
a1
a2
Figure 3: [n = 20,t = 3] The shaded region is the set of
possible polynomials, whilst the light grey area is the set of
the most useful polynomials. The triangle is the boundary
of the set that can be written as t= 3 tournaments. At
p1: a3
.=−8.56×10−4. At p2: a3 .= 1.08×10−3. At p3:
a3
.=1.91×10−4.
0.0150.010.0050.0
5
0
−5
−10
−15
×10−5
p 1»»9
p 2ﬀ
p 3
¢¢¸
a1
a2
Figure 4: [n= 300,t= 3] The shaded region is the set of
possible polynomials, whilst the light grey area is the set of
the most useful polynomials. The triangle is the boundary
of the set that can be written as t= 3 tournaments. At
p1: a3
.=−2.18×10−7. At p2: a3 .= 3.53×10−7. At p3:
a3
.=1.21×10−7.
Figure 5: [n=300] The polynomial y = 0.01−10−4x+
2.781×10−7x2. This is an example of a usable quadratic
polynomial that is not equivalent to a probabilistic tour-
nament.
tently), our theorems still apply. The disadvantage is that
the selection probability for two individuals with the same
fitness may not be the same. We can fix this problem by
breaking ties (uniformly) at random. For instance, given
a population of 3 individuals with two of them having the
same fitness, this results in effective selection probabilities
pieff1 =pi1 and pi
eff
2 =pi
eff
3 =
1
2 (pi2+pi3).
Further work. Investigation of the set of possible poly-
nomials with degree d≥ 3 will be helpful for those appli-
cations requiring higher selective pressures. Furthermore,
finding the proportion that are equivalent to probabilistic
tournaments may provide a reliable method for making
high-degree polynomial rank schemes more efficient.
Tournaments of size t¿n are significantly faster than
ranking schemes, so it would be beneficial to obtain a
thorough understanding of how many polynomial rank
schemes are equivalent to t>d+1 sized probabilistic tour-
naments.
Conclusion. We have found a strong connection between
polynomial ranking and probabilistic tournament selec-
tion.
We derived an explicit operator (15) that maps any
probabilistic tournament to its equivalent polynomial
ranking scheme, which is unique and always exists. Poly-
nomial rank schemes thus encompass linear ranking and
deterministic (normal) tournament selection, leaving de-
signers with one less selection method (but more parame-
ters) to worry about.
Unfortunately, turning polynomial rank schemes into
equivalent probabilistic tournaments is not so straightfor-
ward. Only about a third of the possible quadratic polyno-
mials can be written as size-3 probabilistic tournaments.
However, nearly all linear rank schemes have an equiva-
lent size-2 probabilistic tournament. Hence nearly all can
be made faster by simply rewriting the scheme as a prob-
abilistic tournament.
Furthermore, almost all the practical quadratic polyno-
mials are equivalent to some t=2 tournament. This is a
good indication for the investigation of t>3.
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A Appendix
Uniqueness of a polynomial given t image points.
Let pi ∈ IRt be the vector of t image points piκ = p(xκ)
for some x1,...,xt of a polynomial p(x)=
∑t
l=1alx
l−1 with
coefficient vector a∈IRt. In particular we have
piκ = p(xκ) =
t∑
l=1
alV
l
κ, where V
l
κ = x
l−1
κ
If matrix V is invertible, the polynomial (coefficients)
would be uniquely defined by a= V −1pi, which is what
we set out to prove. We now show that V is invertible.
Define the t polynomials of degree t−1
ps(x) =
t∏
r=1
r 6=s
x− xr
xs − xr =
t∑
l=1
Asl x
l−1
Expanding the product in the numerator defines the coef-
ficients Asl . On xκ we get
δsκ = ps(xκ) =
n∑
l=1
V lκA
s
l
hence A is the inverse of V . By explicitly expanding
∏
(x−
xr) one can get an explicit expression for Asl , which is
unfortunately pretty useless.
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